On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time
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Publication:501748
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- A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
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Cited in
(12)- Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
- Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments
- The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time
- On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620865 (Why is no real title available?)
- Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
- On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Continuous-time games with imperfect and abrupt information
- An experimental study of finitely and infinitely repeated linear public goods games
- Repeated games with frequent signals
- The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games
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