On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time

DOI10.3934/jdg.2017001zbMath1354.91018OpenAlexW3124166736MaRDI QIDQ501748

Mathias Staudigl, Jan-Henrik Steg

Publication date: 10 January 2017

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2017001

zbMATH Keywords

weak convergencecontinuous-time game theoryperfect-public equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Random measures (60G57) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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