The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

DOI10.3982/TE1687zbMATH Open1395.91040MaRDI QIDQ4586040FDOQ4586040

Authors: Benjamin Bernard, Christoph Frei 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• A folk theorem for games when frequent monitoring decreases noise
• On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescontinuous timefolk theoremimperfect observability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (6)

• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Continuous-time games with imperfect and abrupt information
• A folk theorem for games when frequent monitoring decreases noise

This page was built for publication: The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4586040)