The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time

DOI10.3982/TE1687MaRDI QIDQ4586040zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Benjamin Bernard, Christoph Frei

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamescontinuous timefolk theoremimperfect observability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited in

(6)

• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: from discrete to continuous time
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620862 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5620860 (Why is no real title available?)
• Continuous-time games with imperfect and abrupt information
• A folk theorem for games when frequent monitoring decreases noise

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