Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0827zbMath0987.91021OpenAlexW1703484494MaRDI QIDQ5953416

Salvador Barberá, Michael Maschler, Jonathan Shalev

Publication date: 20 June 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/bb9cf1318436014842b91820cbc0bb5b443fb753

zbMATH Keywords

electionsgame theoryvotingnoncooperative gamesclubsequilibrium refinementspure-strategy equilibrium profiles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Markovian strategies with continuous and impulse controls for a differential game model of revolution ⋮ Power set extensions of dichotomous preferences ⋮ Procedural group identification ⋮ An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit ⋮ Coalition formation and stability ⋮ Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations ⋮ Coalition formation under dominance invariance ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness ⋮ Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule ⋮ Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains ⋮ On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency ⋮ Michael Maschler's bibliography ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ On exiting after voting ⋮ Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions ⋮ ON A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS ON NETWORKS WITH APPLICATION TO OPINION FORMATION

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Voting by Committees
• Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item