Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.002zbMath1188.91196OpenAlexW3022862373MaRDI QIDQ1036585

Roger D. Lagunoff

Publication date: 13 November 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityrecursivereformdynamic political gamesdynamically consistent rulesendogenous political institutionsforward and backward consistencyinessential

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (11)

Self-organizing collective action: group dynamics by collective reputation ⋮ Markovian strategies with continuous and impulse controls for a differential game model of revolution ⋮ The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Dynamically consistent voting rules ⋮ Stable constitutions ⋮ In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution ⋮ A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities ⋮ Dynamic legislative policy making ⋮ Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo ⋮ Power fluctuations and political economy ⋮ Meritocracy Voting: Measuring the Unmeasurable

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