Meritocracy voting: measuring the unmeasurable

DOI10.1080/07474938.2014.956633MaRDI QIDQ5864346zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter C. B. Phillips

Publication date 7 June 2022

Published in Econometric Reviews (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1842

zbMATH Keywords

measurementquantificationvotingelectionpeer reviewsubjective assessmentmeritocracybibliometric dataauditing peer reviewfellowship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics (62P99)

Recommendations

• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• Elites and Secret Handshakes Versus Metrics and Rule-Based Acclamation: A Comment on “Measuring the Unmeasurable”
• Majority judgment. Measuring, ranking, and electing.
• Choosing the best among peers
• Voting rules as statistical estimators

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1446889 (Why is no real title available?)
• AUTOMATED DISCOVERY IN ECONOMETRICS
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• FRISCH'S ECONOMETRIC LABORATORY AND THE RISE OF TRYGVE HAAVELMO'S PROBABILITY APPROACH
• Modeling the variability of rankings
• Trygve Haavelmo at the Cowles Commission
• Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective

Cited in

(3)

• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• The limits of meritocracy
• Elites and Secret Handshakes Versus Metrics and Rule-Based Acclamation: A Comment on “Measuring the Unmeasurable”

This page was built for publication: Meritocracy voting: measuring the unmeasurable

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5864346)