Meritocracy voting: measuring the unmeasurable

DOI10.1080/07474938.2014.956633zbMATH Open1491.62281OpenAlexW1972148854MaRDI QIDQ5864346FDOQ5864346

Authors: Peter C. B. Phillips 

Publication date: 7 June 2022

Published in: Econometric Reviews (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1842

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zbMATH Keywords

measurementquantificationvotingelectionpeer reviewsubjective assessmentmeritocracybibliometric dataauditing peer reviewfellowship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics (62P99)

Cites Work

• Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective
• Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions
• Modeling the variability of rankings
• AUTOMATED DISCOVERY IN ECONOMETRICS
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• FRISCH'S ECONOMETRIC LABORATORY AND THE RISE OF TRYGVE HAAVELMO'S PROBABILITY APPROACH
• Trygve Haavelmo at the Cowles Commission

Cited In (3)

• Elites and Secret Handshakes Versus Metrics and Rule-Based Acclamation: A Comment on “Measuring the Unmeasurable”
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
• The limits of meritocracy

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