On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
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- An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
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- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
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Cited in
(7)- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
- Double-interval societies
- Clusterability of groups and information exchange in group decision making with approval voting system.
- On exiting after voting
- Externality effects in the formation of societies
- Stability and voting by committees with exit
- Democratic forking: choosing sides with social choice
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