On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
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Publication:683523
DOI10.1007/s11238-017-9644-6zbMath1395.91164OpenAlexW2772552471MaRDI QIDQ683523
Gustavo Bergantiños, Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó
Publication date: 8 February 2018
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/182575
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Cites Work
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