Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems
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Publication:892977
DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9470-zzbMath1377.91128OpenAlexW1976477584MaRDI QIDQ892977
Duygu Nizamogullari, İpek Özkal-Sanver
Publication date: 13 November 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9470-z
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Cites Work
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
- Impossibilities for roommate problems
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- A polynomial-time algorithm for the bistable roommates problem
- Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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