Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems
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Recommendations
- The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs
- Consistency and its converse for roommate markets
- A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
Cites work
- A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem
- A polynomial-time algorithm for the bistable roommates problem
- Absorbing sets in roommate problems
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
- Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems
- Impossibilities for roommate problems
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
- Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
Cited in
(6)- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
- The minimal consistent core: a converse consistent enlargement and alternative axiomatizations
- A note on roommate problems with a limited number of rooms
- Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
- The roommate problem with externalities
- Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution
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