Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0588-4MaRDI QIDQ2452139zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors İpek Özkal-Sanver

Publication date 30 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0588-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Consistent enlargements of the core in roommate problems
• A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem
• On the invariance of male optimal stable matching

Cites work

• A note on gender fairness in matching problems.
• A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
• Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
• Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies
• Characterization of an extended Walrasian concept for open economies
• Claims problems and weighted generalizations of the Talmud rule
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Consistent extensions
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
• Impossibilities for roommate problems
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form
• The converse consistency principle in bargaining.
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result

Cited in

(4)

• Effective method for constrained minimum - reverse bridge theorem
• Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement
• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency

This page was built for publication: Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2452139)