Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0588-4zbMATH Open1287.91118OpenAlexW2095174721MaRDI QIDQ2452139FDOQ2452139

Authors: İpek Özkal-Sanver 

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0588-4

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies
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• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
• Consistent extensions
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• Nash implementation of matching rules
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• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
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• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
• Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
• The consistency principle for games in strategic form
• A note on gender fairness in matching problems.
• Characterization of an extended Walrasian concept for open economies

Cited In (4)

• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
• Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
• Effective method for constrained minimum - reverse bridge theorem
• Local and global consistency properties for student placement

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