Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies
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Publication:1919716
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(95)00727-XzbMath0853.90017OpenAlexW2159938922MaRDI QIDQ1919716
Anne van den Nouweland, S. H. Tijs, Bezalel Peleg
Publication date: 17 October 1996
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(95)00727-x
Related Items (6)
Share equilibrium in local public good economies ⋮ Minimal conversely consistent extension of the men-optimal solution ⋮ Horizontal equity and stability when the number of agents is variable in the fair division problem ⋮ Characterization of an extended Walrasian concept for open economies ⋮ Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies ⋮ The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.
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