Horizontal equity and stability when the number of agents is variable in the fair division problem

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(95)00718-0MaRDI QIDQ672776zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors François Maniquet

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(95)00718-0

zbMATH Keywords

ConsistencyEqual Income Walrasian ruleFair division

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Monotonicity, stability and egalitarianism
• Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions
• Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences
• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked

Cites work

• A characterization of the Walras rule
• A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
• Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies

Cited in

(2)

• Strategy-proofness in linear production economies with homothetic or quasi-linear preferences
• Consistency and its converse: an introduction

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