Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions

DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9467-7MaRDI QIDQ892978zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors G. Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Inés Moreno de Barreda, Alejandro Neme

Publication date 13 November 2015

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11336/60780

zbMATH Keywords

division problemstable partitionsymmetric single-peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

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• A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule
• A simple characterization of the uniform rule
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• An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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• Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Division rules and migration equilibria
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• Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
• Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
• Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategy-proof allotment rules
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
• The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
• Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy

Cited in

(6)

• The division problem with voluntary participation
• Stable sharing
• Stable skew partition problem
• A random arrival rule for division problems with multiple references
• Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
• Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems

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