Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions

DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9467-7zbMATH Open1377.91113OpenAlexW2272667972MaRDI QIDQ892978FDOQ892978

Authors: G. Bergantiños, Jordi Massó, Inés Moreno de Barreda, Alejandro Neme 

Publication date: 13 November 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11336/60780

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zbMATH Keywords

division problemstable partitionsymmetric single-peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
• On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
• Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
• The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
• On fixed-path rationing methods.
• Migration disequilibrium and specific division rules

Cited In (6)

• The division problem with voluntary participation
• Stable skew partition problem
• A random arrival rule for division problems with multiple references
• Stable partitions for proportional generalized claims problems
• Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
• Stable sharing

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