Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
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Publication:2467519
DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0198-zzbMath1203.91081OpenAlexW2150376598MaRDI QIDQ2467519
Anna Bogomolnaia, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Aleksej Vladimirovich Savvateev
Publication date: 22 January 2008
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1781/1/stability_jurisdiction.pdf
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Cites Work
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- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities
- Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.
- Potential games
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: a unidimensional illustration
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- The Role of Market Size in the Formation of Jurisdictions
- Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation
- Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
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