Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core

DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0043-4zbMATH Open1131.91020OpenAlexW2119529013MaRDI QIDQ869239FDOQ869239

Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Alexei Savvateev, Anna Bogomolnaia

Publication date: 27 February 2007

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1777/1/stability_unanimous.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coreequal sharefree mobilityadmission under unanimous consentJurisdiction structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization (90C31) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules
• The role of market size in the formation of jurisdictions
• An economic theory of public facilities in space
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: a unidimensional illustration
• Efficiency and stability in a discrete model of country formation
• Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects.

Cited In (3)

• Free mobility and taste-homogeneity of jurisdiction structures
• The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis
• ``Almost subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting

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