Free mobility and taste-homogeneity of jurisdiction structures
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Publication:532734
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0209-yzbMath1211.91119OpenAlexW2045388335MaRDI QIDQ532734
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/15809
Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10) Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in economics (91B72)
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Cites Work
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