Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives

DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1035zbMath0797.90126OpenAlexW2033916159MaRDI QIDQ1802035

Shlomo Weber, Joseph Greenberg

Publication date: 8 August 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/stable-coalition-structures-with-unidimensional-set-of-alternatives(862a45ab-c630-4d3c-a0fa-d6bd87c40e5b).html

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycorecoalition formationsingle-peakedness\(\varepsilon\)-equilibriumunidimensionality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (16)

Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers ⋮ Stable coalition structures with externalities ⋮ The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games ⋮ Formation of segregated and integrated groups ⋮ On coalition formation: durable coalition structures. ⋮ Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games ⋮ Economic foundations of generalized games with shared constraint: do binding agreements lead to less Nash equilibria? ⋮ Finding the strong Nash equilibrium: computation, existence and characterization for Markov games ⋮ Free mobility and taste-homogeneity of jurisdiction structures ⋮ Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect ⋮ Self-selection consistent functions ⋮ The stability of hedonic coalition structures ⋮ Stability and segregation in group formation ⋮ Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness ⋮ Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures ⋮ The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights

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