Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives

DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1035zbMATH Open0797.90126OpenAlexW2033916159MaRDI QIDQ1802035FDOQ1802035

Authors: Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber 

Publication date: 8 August 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/stable-coalition-structures-with-unidimensional-set-of-alternatives(862a45ab-c630-4d3c-a0fa-d6bd87c40e5b).html

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zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoalition formationcoresingle-peakedness\(\varepsilon\)-equilibriumunidimensionality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (24)

• Finding the strong Nash equilibrium: computation, existence and characterization for Markov games
• Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect
• Self-selection consistent functions
• Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
• Stability and segregation in group formation
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Formation of segregated and integrated groups
• On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
• Free mobility and taste-homogeneity of jurisdiction structures
• The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights
• The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games
• Economic foundations of generalized games with shared constraint: do binding agreements lead to less Nash equilibria?
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• Consistent @d-Relative Majority Equilibria
• A polyhedral approach to the stability of a family of coalitions
• Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets
• Stochastic Approach for Determining Stable Coalition Structure
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
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• Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
• Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games

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