The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights
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Cites work
- A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
- Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
- Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
- Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
- Local public goods with mobility: Existence and optimality of a general equilibrium
- Second best taxation as a game
- Stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems
- Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives
- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- The Lindahl solution with changing population and recsources
- The stability of hedonic coalition structures
- Voting with ballots and feet: Existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy
- Weakly democratic regular tax equilibria in a local public goods economy with perfect consumer mobility
Cited in
(5)- Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
- Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
- A Tiebout theorem
- A Dynamic Tiebout Theory of Voluntary vs. Involuntary Provision of Public Goods
- Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?
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