The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9430-7zbMath1377.91092OpenAlexW2108046471MaRDI QIDQ2353590

Göksel Aşan, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 15 July 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9430-7

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationmembership property rightsTiebout hypothesisimpure public goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

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• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures