A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures

Cited in

(24)

Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization
Local public goods with mobility: Existence and optimality of a general equilibrium
Local public goods and average cost pricing
Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
A Tiebout theorem
Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set
Decentralization in replicated club economies with multiple private goods
Weakly democratic regular tax equilibria in a local public goods economy with perfect consumer mobility
Core equivalence with congested public goods
On the set of Pareto efficient allocations in economies with public goods
Capitalization, decentralization, and intergenerational spillovers in a tiebout economy with a durable public good
The Tiebout hypothesis under membership property rights
Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods
Tiebout economies with differential genetic types and endogenously chosen crowding characteristics
Clubs and the market: Large finite economies
Club theory and household formation
The formation of social groups under status concern
Stability and segregation in group formation
Sustainable oligopolies
Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?
Formation of segregated and integrated groups

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