Sustainable oligopolies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(91)90132-NMaRDI QIDQ810355zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gabrielle Demange, Dominique Henriet

Publication date 1991

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90132-n

zbMATH Keywords

quality differentiationoligopoly marketsustainable oligopolyvertical or horizontal product differentiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Stability and instability in oligopoly
• Cournot competition in a differentiated oligopoly
• Scale economies and existence of sustainable monopoly prices
• Stability in a general oligopoly model
• Oligopoly, endogenous monopolist and product quality

Cites work

• A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures
• Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule
• Natural Oligopolies
• Price competition, quality and income disparities
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain

Cited in

(17)

• Strongly balanced cooperative games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4076917 (Why is no real title available?)
• Successive oligopolies and decreasing returns
• Oligopoly, endogenous monopolist and product quality
• SUSTAINABILITY IN A MULTIPRODUCT AND MULTIPLE AGENT CONTESTABLE MARKET
• Gabrielle Demange
• Inducing efficiency in oligopolistic markets with increasing returns to scale
• Natural oligopolies with exogenous sunk costs: a non-Suttonian result
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Anything goes with heterogeneous, but not always with homogeneous oligopoly
• Game theoretic modeling of increasing returns to scale
• Networks and stability
• On the existence of strong Nash equilibria
• Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
• Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness
• The formation of social groups under status concern
• Stable outcomes in simple cooperative games

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