Dynamic coalitional equilibrium
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Publication:533100
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.006zbMath1282.91037OpenAlexW2134133842MaRDI QIDQ533100
Publication date: 2 May 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.006
Related Items (4)
Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures ⋮ Simple collective equilibria in stopping games ⋮ Subgame-perfection in free transition games
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