Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205836 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215739 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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- Dynamic legislative policy making
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- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Periodic stopping games
- Quitting Games
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
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- Subgame perfection in positive recursive games with perfect information
- Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information and Differential Equations
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- The Big Match
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
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