Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
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Publication:2050982
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.102467zbMATH Open1470.91061OpenAlexW3119891233MaRDI QIDQ2050982FDOQ2050982
Authors: Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings 
Publication date: 1 September 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.102467
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