Simple collective equilibria in stopping games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.102467MaRDI QIDQ2050982zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arkadi Predtetchinski, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date 1 September 2021

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.102467

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationvotingstationary equilibriumsubgame perfect equilibriumcollective choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Games of timing (91A55)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205836 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
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Cited in

(4)

• Cooperative Strategies in Stopping Games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3914022 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimizing over pure stationary equilibria in consensus stopping games
• Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games

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