Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.011zbMath1200.91083OpenAlexW2057162485MaRDI QIDQ608550

Vincent Anesi

Publication date: 25 November 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.011

zbMATH Keywords

stable setlegislative bargainingcommitteestationary Markov equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (12)

Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players ⋮ Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter ⋮ Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions ⋮ A new old solution for weak tournaments ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria ⋮ Simple collective equilibria in stopping games ⋮ Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power ⋮ Stable cores in information graph games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• On dynamic compromise
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• STABLE SETS FOR SIMPLE GAMES WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition

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