Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.02.011MaRDI QIDQ608550zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincent Anesi

Publication date 25 November 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.011

zbMATH Keywords

committeelegislative bargainingstable setstationary Markov equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• On dynamic compromise
• STABLE SETS FOR SIMPLE GAMES WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES

Cited in

(21)

• The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games
• Stability of voting games
• An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Simple collective equilibria in stopping games
• Stable cores in information graph games
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
• Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
• A new old solution for weak tournaments
• Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria
• BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH
• Do stable outcomes survive in marriage problems with myopic and farsighted players?
• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• Dynamic stable set as a tournament solution
• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
• Set-theoretic inequalities in stochastic noncooperative games with coalition

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