Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
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Publication:2323591
DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1090-8zbMath1422.91291OpenAlexW2770907875MaRDI QIDQ2323591
Publication date: 3 September 2019
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1090-8
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
- Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
- Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
- A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
- On dynamic compromise
- Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
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