Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power

DOI10.1007/S00199-017-1090-8MaRDI QIDQ2323591zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David P. Baron

Publication date 3 September 2019

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1090-8

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsdynamic legislative bargainingproposal power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Legislative bargaining with teams

Cites work

• A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game
• Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
• Dynamic bargaining and stability with veto players
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games
• Fully absorbing dynamic compromise
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• On dynamic compromise
• The dynamics of distributive politics

Cited in

(20)

• Optimal team size under legislative bargaining with costly recognition
• Legislative bargaining with a stochastic surplus and costly~recognition
• Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements
• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Reaching across the aisle to block reforms
• Channeling the final say in politics: a simple mechanism
• The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
• Minimum winning versus oversized coalitions in public finance: the role of uncertainty
• Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis
• On dynamic compromise
• Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• Legislative bargaining with teams
• Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
• Executive control and legislative success
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• Bargaining in legislatures: a new donation paradox
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Competitive elections, incumbency advantage, and accountability
• Optimal coalition size when making proposals is costly

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