Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

DOI10.3982/TE2215zbMATH Open1396.91224MaRDI QIDQ4682736FDOQ4682736

Authors: Vincent Anesi, John Duggan 

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingendogenous status quoMarkovian equilibriumsimple solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cited In (6)

• Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
• Simple dynamics of legislative bargaining: coalitions and proposal power
• Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria

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