Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.004zbMath1125.91005OpenAlexW2127425289MaRDI QIDQ2491878

Hamid Sabourian, Douglas Gale

Publication date: 29 May 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0322.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competitionbargainingMarkov-perfect equilibriumrandom matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites Work

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• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
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• Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
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• Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium