Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
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Publication:2491878
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.004zbMath1125.91005MaRDI QIDQ2491878
Publication date: 29 May 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0322.pdf
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A18: Games in extensive form
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
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Cites Work
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- Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
- Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
- Security Equilibrium
- Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium