Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.004zbMath1125.91005MaRDI QIDQ2491878

Hamid Sabourian, Douglas Gale

Publication date: 29 May 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0322.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competition; bargaining; Markov-perfect equilibrium; random matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A18: Games in extensive form

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

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Cites Work

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• Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
• Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
• Security Equilibrium
• Matching and Bargaining in Dynamic Markets
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium