Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1097824
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(87)90114-1zbMath0635.90015OpenAlexW2136431647WikidataQ56852504 ScholiaQ56852504MaRDI QIDQ1097824
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90114-1
tradebargainingbargaincompetitive (flow) equilibriuminfinite sequence of datesnon-cooperative, strategic game
Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items
Foundation of competitive equilibrium with non-transferable utility, Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome, Monetary mechanisms, Sequential bargaining and competition, On the efficiency of ex ante and ex post pricing institutions, Bilateral bargaining in networks, Coalitional Bargaining in Networks, Switching from complete to incomplete information, FOR-PROFIT SEARCH PLATFORMS, Scale returns of a random matching model, Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market, Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, Bilateral trading and incomplete information: price convergence in a small market, Price dispersion in stationary networked markets, Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price, Stable marriages and search frictions, Bargaining on supply chain networks with heterogeneous valuations, Bargaining in small dynamic markets, Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets., Markov equilibria in a model of bargaining in networks, Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium, Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: an inversion result, Price discovery in a matching and bargaining market with aggregate uncertainty, Search theory, competitive equilibrium, and the Nash bargaining solution, Bargaining and competition revisited., Retrading in market games., Convergence to perfect competition of a dynamic matching and bargaining market with two-sided incomplete information and exogenous exit rate, Bargaining and network structure: an experiment, A Walrasian Rubinstein and Wolinsky model, Bargaining and efficiency in networks, Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines, Steady states in matching and bargaining, Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers, The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets, Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks, BUYERS, SELLERS, AND MIDDLEMEN: VARIATIONS ON SEARCH‐THEORETIC THEMES, Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade, A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings, The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms, A general equilibrium analysis of strategic arbitrage, The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: can it be good for efficiency?, Bargaining in dynamic markets, Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games, Endogenous market integration, manipulation and limits to arbitrage, Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information, The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation, Matching markets with adverse selection, An optimistic search equilibrium, A decentralized market with trading links, Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets, Delay in Trade Networks, Walrasian equilibrium in matching models, Bargaining frictions in trading networks, A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium, Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
Cites Work
