Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
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Publication:387329
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2013.04.008zbMATH Open1280.91080OpenAlexW2007459710MaRDI QIDQ387329FDOQ387329
Authors: Helmut Bester 
Publication date: 20 December 2013
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13289/
Recommendations
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- Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities
- Investment, matching and persistence in a modified cash-in-advance economy
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- Investment and Competitive Matching
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- Competitive equilibria in matching models with financial constraints
- On a linear problem of collective investment
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- On cores and indivisibility
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
- A model of random matching
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
- The Long Side of the Market and the Short End of the Stick: Bargaining Power and Price Formation in Buyers', Sellers', and Balanced Markets
- A dynamic theory of holdup.
- A model of partnership formation
- Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference points
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- Prices, delay, and the dynamics of trade
Cited In (9)
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- Holdups and overinvestment in capital markets
- Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options
- Pre-match investment with frictions
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Holdup, search, and inefficiency
- Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
- Investment and Competitive Matching
- Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities
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