Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities

DOI10.1007/S00182-015-0522-6MaRDI QIDQ521878zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Thomas Gall

Publication date 12 April 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0522-6

zbMATH Keywords

assignment modelsgraph theoryinvestmentsmatchingnontransferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Noncooperative games (91A10) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Investment and Competitive Matching
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information
• Pricing and investments in matching markets

Cites work

• A law of large numbers for large economies
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Co-ranking mates: assortative matching in marriage markets
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
• The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results

Cited in

(2)

• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• Pre-match investment with frictions

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