Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities
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Publication:521878
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0522-6zbMath1398.91455OpenAlexW2240665336WikidataQ59615062 ScholiaQ59615062MaRDI QIDQ521878
Publication date: 12 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0522-6
Cites Work
- Co-ranking mates: assortative matching in marriage markets
- On a theorem of Schmeidler
- Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
- The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
- A law of large numbers for large economies
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
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