Pricing and investments in matching markets
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Publication:4585983
DOI10.3982/TE1189zbMath1395.91347MaRDI QIDQ4585983
Larry Samuelson, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1189
Related Items
Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning, On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching, Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach, Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers, Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities, Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium, Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem, Inefficient sorting under output sharing, Pre-matching gambles, On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information, Strategic disaggregation in matching markets, Efficient investments in the implementation problem, Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
Cites Work
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