Pricing and investments in matching markets
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Publication:4585983
DOI10.3982/TE1189zbMATH Open1395.91347OpenAlexW3123086201MaRDI QIDQ4585983FDOQ4585983
Authors: George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson 
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1189
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Cites Work
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
- The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals
- Real analysis
- Strategic Information Revelation
- Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options
- Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
- Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium
- Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search
Cited In (21)
- Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
- Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Strategic disaggregation in matching markets
- Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets
- Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
- Price discrimination and efficient matching
- On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
- Inefficient sorting under output sharing
- Pre-matching gambles
- Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Investment and Competitive Matching
- Matching heterogeneous traders in quantity-regulated markets
- Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling
- Comparative statics for size-dependent discounts in matching markets
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
- Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
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