Inefficient sorting under output sharing

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105031MaRDI QIDQ2173113zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wing Tung Lam

Publication date 22 April 2020

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105031

zbMATH Keywords

sortingdirected searchlinkage principleassortative matchinglinear contractshosios condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

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• Marriage and Class
• Matching to share risk
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• Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility
• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
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• Sorting and decentralized price competition
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The nonatomic assignment model
• Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting
• Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?^*

Cited in

(2)

• Social preferences, sorting, and competition
• Inefficient labor market sorting

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