Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.020zbMath1254.91528OpenAlexW1992541797MaRDI QIDQ1927911

Konstantinos Serfes

Publication date: 2 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.020

zbMATH Keywords

risk sharingendogenous matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (9)

Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology ⋮ Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay ⋮ Inefficient sorting under output sharing ⋮ The moral hazard problem with high stakes ⋮ Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships ⋮ Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents ⋮ Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers

Cites Work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds
• Assortative Matching and Search

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