Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay
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Publication:1654085
Recommendations
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Cites work
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
- Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
- Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
- The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
Cited in
(7)- Collective organizations versus relative performance contracts: Inequality, risk sharing, and moral hazard
- Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
- Moral hazard and compensation packages: does reshuffling matter?
- An experimental investigation of the `tenuous trade-off' between risk and incentives in organizations
- The dynamics of incentives, productivity, and operational risk
- Threat of termination and firm innovation
- Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
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