Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
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Recommendations
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1159201
Cites work
- Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
- Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
- Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841893 (Why is no real title available?)
- Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
- The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
Cited in
(12)- Moral hazard in innovation: the relationship between risk aversion and performance pay
- Consistency between principal and agent with differing time horizons: computing incentives under risk
- Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
- Endogenous firm efficiency in a Cournot principal-agent model
- Risk-incentives trade-off and outside options
- Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk
- Endogenous agency problems and the dynamics of rents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1159201 (Why is no real title available?)
- The importance of being honest
- The dynamics of incentives, productivity, and operational risk
- Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
- Endogenous verifiability and optimality in agency
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