Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
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Publication:2482668
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0109-yzbMath1151.91074OpenAlexW2018959350MaRDI QIDQ2482668
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0109-y
Related Items
Bidding for incentive contracts, Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology, Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game, Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers, Principal-Agent Models, Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships, Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers, Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts, Participation in moral hazard problems
Cites Work
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