Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents

DOI10.1007/S00182-007-0109-YMaRDI QIDQ2482668zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Konstantinos Serfes

Publication date 23 April 2008

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0109-y

zbMATH Keywords

assignment Gameendogenous matchingrisk sharing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Assortative Matching and Search
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841893 (Why is no real title available?)
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The nonatomic assignment model
• The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers

Cited in

(16)

• Bidding for incentive contracts
• Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology
• Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts
• Two-sided heterogeneity, endogenous sharing, and international matching markets
• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers
• Endogenous firm efficiency in a Cournot principal-agent model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1507174 (Why is no real title available?)
• Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships
• Principal-agent models
• Participation in moral hazard problems
• Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
• Matching with nonexclusive contracts
• Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers

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