Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents

DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0109-yzbMath1151.91074OpenAlexW2018959350MaRDI QIDQ2482668

Konstantinos Serfes

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0109-y

zbMATH Keywords

risk sharingendogenous matchingassignment Game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

Bidding for incentive contracts ⋮ Optimal incentives in a principal-agent model with endogenous technology ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers ⋮ Principal-Agent Models ⋮ Moral hazard and sorting in a market for partnerships ⋮ Incentive contracts under product market competition and R\&D spillovers ⋮ Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts ⋮ Participation in moral hazard problems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The nonatomic assignment model
• The risk and incentives trade-off in the presence of heterogeneous managers
• Risk sharing vs. incentives: contract design under two-sided heterogeneity
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Monotone Matching in Perfect and Imperfect Worlds
• Assortative Matching and Search
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents