Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.03.023MaRDI QIDQ1929428zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sam Schulhofer-Wohl

Publication date 8 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.023

zbMATH Keywords

assortative matchingrisk sharingtransferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk
• Matching to share risk
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• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard

Cites work

• Additive Utility Functions and Linear Engel Curves
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment
• When do market games have transferable utility?

Cited in

(9)

• Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty
• Inefficient sorting under output sharing
• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• Assortative matching and risk sharing
• Matching to share risk
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Non-stationary search and assortative matching
• Stochastic sorting
• Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk

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