Matching to share risk

DOI10.3982/TE1914MaRDI QIDQ4586072zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Philip J. Reny, Pierre-André Chiappori

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1914

zbMATH Keywords

negatively assortative matchingrisk sharingstable match

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(16)

• Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility
• Information design in competitive insurance markets
• Inefficient sorting under output sharing
• Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Individual vs. couple behavior: an experimental investigation of risk preferences
• Over-investment in marriage-specific capital
• Assortative matching and risk sharing
• Balanced Risk Set Matching
• Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• Non-stationary search and assortative matching
• Stable matching games
• The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game
• Stochastic sorting
• Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk

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