Stable matching games
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Cites work
- A Note on Strictly Competitive Games
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Almost Strictly Competitive Games
- Bargaining and Reputation
- Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching
- Core and competitive equilibria with indivisibilities
- Generalized Nash games and quasi-variational inequalities
- Graphs and Marriages
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207367 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099363 (Why is no real title available?)
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Investment and Competitive Matching
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- Matching to share risk
- Of Stable Marriages and Graphs, and Strategy and Polytopes
- On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
- Quasi variational inequalities
- Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
- Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply
- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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