Matching to share risk
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Publication:4586072
DOI10.3982/TE1914zbMATH Open1395.91339OpenAlexW2145717839MaRDI QIDQ4586072FDOQ4586072
Authors: Philip J. Reny, Pierre-André Chiappori
Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1914
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- Information design in competitive insurance markets
- Over-investment in marriage-specific capital
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- Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
- Assortative matching of risk-averse agents with endogenous risk
- Balanced Risk Set Matching
- Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Inefficient sorting under output sharing
- Individual vs. couple behavior: an experimental investigation of risk preferences
- Risk-sharing matching and moral hazard
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