Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2713zbMath0985.91047OpenAlexW2022300108MaRDI QIDQ5945727

Shou Yong Shi

Publication date: 14 October 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/00d637138a6e4a40ae67224a7062dbe5ae17a9ef

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymatchingwage inequalityfrictionsskills

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (25)

Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation ⋮ Inefficient sorting under output sharing ⋮ Targeted search, endogenous market segmentation, and wage inequality ⋮ Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments ⋮ A theory of production, matching, and distribution ⋮ Pricing and investments in matching markets ⋮ Block-recursive equilibria in heterogeneous-agent models ⋮ Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach ⋮ HETEROGENEITY, FRICTIONAL ASSIGNMENT, AND HOME‐OWNERSHIP ⋮ Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion ⋮ Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions ⋮ A monetary theory with non-degenerate distributions ⋮ Equivalence of canonical matching models ⋮ Pricing and signaling with frictions ⋮ Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers ⋮ The pre-marital investment game ⋮ Search Theory: The 2010 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences ⋮ Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets ⋮ Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium ⋮ Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms ⋮ Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job ⋮ Efficiency in search and matching models: a generalized hosios condition ⋮ Intermediation in over-the-counter markets with price transparency ⋮ Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search ⋮ Pricing, signalling, and sorting with frictions

Cites Work

• Bidding for money
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
• Marriage and Class
• Assortative Matching and Search
• Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency