Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium
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Publication:545178
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2011.01.011zbMATH Open1230.91099OpenAlexW2067421255MaRDI QIDQ545178FDOQ545178
Authors: Adrian Masters 
Publication date: 22 June 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2008/paper_260.pdf
Recommendations
- Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments
- Competitive search, efficiency, and multiworker firms
- Incentives in competitive search equilibrium
- Advertising intensity and welfare in an equilibrium search model
- Investment and Competitive Matching
Cites Work
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
- Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
Cited In (5)
- Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Frictional capital reallocation. I: Ex ante heterogeneity
- Discretionary acquisition of firm-specific human capital under non-verifiable performance
- Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments
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