Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.001MaRDI QIDQ2254032zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Benjamin Lester, Ludo Visschers, Ronald Wolthoff

Publication date 4 February 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/18097806/Meeting_Technologies_and_Optimal_Trading_Mechanisms_in_Competitive_Search_Markets.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanismsmatching functionmeeting technologysearch frictions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
• A note on Peters and Severinov, ``Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• Competing with asking prices
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Directed search with multiple job applications
• Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
• Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
• Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3168164 (Why is no real title available?)
• Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Over-the-Counter Markets
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• Thinning, Entropy, and the Law of Thin Numbers

Cited in

(19)

• Bidding for incentive contracts
• Minimum prices in a model with search frictions and price posting
• A theory of production, matching, and distribution
• Efficiency in search and matching models: a generalized hosios condition
• Equilibrium price and advertisement distributions
• Competitive search with ex-post opportunism
• Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
• Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
• Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
• Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse
• Seller competition by mechanism design
• Should buyers or sellers organize trade in a frictional market?
• MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
• Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion
• Strategic limitation of market accessibility: search platform design and welfare
• Optimal product design: implications for competition and growth under declining search frictions
• Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection
• Simultaneous search and adverse selection
• Spatial search

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