A note on Peters and Severinov, ``Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.11.014MaRDI QIDQ665475zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Susan Vroman, James W. Albrecht, Pieter A. Gautier

Publication date 5 March 2012

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.014

zbMATH Keywords

competing auctionsdirected search

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
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Cites work

• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices

Cited in

(11)

• Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
• Frictions in Internet auctions with many traders: a counterexample
• A theory of production, matching, and distribution
• Efficiency in search and matching models: a generalized hosios condition
• Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
• Efficient club formation in a frictional environment
• Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
• MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
• Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion
• Comment on: ``Auctions with a buy price: the case of reference-dependent preferences
• From monopoly to competition: when do optimal contests prevail?

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