Efficient club formation in a frictional environment

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.016zbMath1311.91116OpenAlexW1992327284MaRDI QIDQ2345251

Moritz Ritter, John Kennes, Benoît Julien

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.016

zbMATH Keywords

directed searchcompeting auctionsclub goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• A note on Peters and Severinov, ``Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Equilibria, the core, and jurisdiction structures in economies with a local public good
• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• The Tiebout Hypothesis: Near Optimality in Local Public Good Economies
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Clubs and the Market