Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
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Publication:2397643
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3613366 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3320765 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
- A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Adverse selection in competitive search equilibrium
- Competing with asking prices
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts
- Directed search with multiple job applications
- Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
- Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
- Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
- On-the-job search, mismatch and efficiency
- Pricing and signaling with frictions
- Sorting and decentralized price competition
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
Cited in
(14)- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion
- Should buyers or sellers organize trade in a frictional market?
- Bidding for incentive contracts
- A theory of production, matching, and distribution
- Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
- Competitive search markets for durable goods
- Search frictions, market power, and long-run growth
- Competitive search with ex-post opportunism
- Endogenous market segmentation with heterogeneous agents
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
- Aggregation in economies with search frictions
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