Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
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Publication:2397643
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2017.03.002zbMATH Open1400.91212OpenAlexW3126049684MaRDI QIDQ2397643FDOQ2397643
Pieter A. Gautier, Xiaoming Cai, Ronald Wolthoff
Publication date: 23 May 2017
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/16036.pdf
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
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- A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
- Directed search with multiple job applications
- Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Pricing and signaling with frictions
- Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium
- Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts
- A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill?Biased Technology
- Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices
- Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition
- Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- On-the-Job Search, Mismatch and Efficiency*
- Competing with asking prices
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
Cited In (12)
- Competitive search with ex-post opportunism
- Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion
- Bidding for incentive contracts
- Competitive search markets for durable goods
- Endogenous market segmentation with heterogeneous agents
- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- Search frictions, market power, and long-run growth
- Aggregation in economies with search frictions
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power
- A theory of production, matching, and distribution
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
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