Pricing and signaling with frictions

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.006zbMath1285.91047MaRDI QIDQ2447259

Alain Delacroix, Shou Yong Shi

Publication date: 25 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/public/workingPapers/tecipa-298.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

signaling; efficiency; bargaining; search; pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion, Wages as signals of worker mobility, Customer relationship and sales, Undefeated equilibria of the Shi-Trejos-Wright model under adverse selection, The threat of counterfeiting in competitive search equilibrium, Pricing, signalling, and sorting with frictions, Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search, Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation, COMMITMENT AND COSTLY SIGNALING IN DECENTRALIZED MARKETS

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Should Buyers or Sellers Organize Trade in a Frictional Market?*
• Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency