Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105121MaRDI QIDQ2220933zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xiaoming Cai, Pieter A. Gautier, Susan Vroman, James W. Albrecht

Publication date 25 January 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://papers.tinbergen.nl/19054.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competing mechanismsdirected searchefficiencymarket powermultiple applications

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39)

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Cites work

• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• Competitive non-linear pricing and bundling
• Directed search with multiple job applications
• Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
• Equilibrium Price Dispersion
• Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
• Indeterminacy and directed search.
• Limits of exact equilibria for capacity constrained sellers with costly search.
• Matching with phantoms
• Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
• Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation
• On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
• Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
• Simultaneous Search
• Sorting and decentralized price competition
• Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
• Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions

Cited in

(9)

• Directed search with multiple job applications
• Matching with multiple applications.
• Role of common preferences in the outcome of many-to-many matching
• Ranking and search effort in matching
• On the foundations of competitive search equilibrium with and without market makers
• Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications
• Competitive search, efficiency, and multiworker firms
• Simultaneous search and adverse selection
• Job applications and labour market flows

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