Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
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Cites work
- Assortative Matching and Search
- Bidding for money
- Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-Steady States
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226090 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3070160 (Why is no real title available?)
- Marriage and Class
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
- Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs
Cited in
(33)- Is assortative matching efficient?
- Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments
- A theory of production, matching, and distribution
- Efficiency in search and matching models: a generalized hosios condition
- Intermediation in over-the-counter markets with price transparency
- Pricing, signalling, and sorting with frictions
- Inefficient sorting under output sharing
- Targeted search, endogenous market segmentation, and wage inequality
- Equivalence of canonical matching models
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
- Specialization and efficiency with labor-market matching
- Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search
- Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
- A monetary theory with non-degenerate distributions
- Pricing and signaling with frictions
- The pre-marital investment game
- Search theory: the 2010 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
- Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach
- Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions
- Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress
- Pricing and investments in matching markets
- Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs
- Price formation in a matching market with targeted offers
- Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium
- Block-recursive equilibria in heterogeneous-agent models
- HETEROGENEITY, FRICTIONAL ASSIGNMENT, AND HOME‐OWNERSHIP
- Sequentially mixed search and equilibrium price dispersion
- Choosing sides in a two-sided matching market
- Repeated matching, career concerns, and firm size
- Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare
- Efficient investment, search, and sorting in matching markets
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job
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