Two-sided micro-matching with technical progress
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3177183 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- On the core of linear production games
- Price discrimination and efficient matching
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium
- The Technology Cycle and Inequality
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