Choosing sides in a two-sided matching market

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2022-0126MaRDI QIDQ6136270zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kit Zhou

Publication date 29 August 2023

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2022-0126

zbMATH Keywords

assignment problemstwo-sided matchingwage inequality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Cites work

• Assortative matching with large firms
• Firming Up Inequality*
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 477584 (Why is no real title available?)
• Investment and Competitive Matching
• Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies
• Optimal partition of a large labor force into working pairs
• Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Workplace heterogeneity and the rise of West German wage inequality

Cited in

(3)

• Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
• Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency

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