Marriage and Class
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cited in
(49)- Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
- Separation cycles
- Exchanging good ideas.
- A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
- On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
- Competitive search equilibrium with multidimensional heterogeneity and two-sided ex-ante investments
- Becker's assortative assignments: Stability and fairness
- Bargaining in dynamic markets
- A note on cohabitation and marriage
- The bargaining trap
- Role of common preferences in the outcome of many-to-many matching
- Inefficient sorting under output sharing
- Pre-matching gambles
- Targeted search, endogenous market segmentation, and wage inequality
- Strategic mating with common preferences
- Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
- Specialization and efficiency with labor-market matching
- Matching with interviews
- Intermediation in markets for goods and markets for assets
- Decentralized matching and social segregation
- Dress to impress: brands as status symbols
- Matching with noise and the acceptance curse
- Ranking and search effort in matching
- Marriage, markets, and money: a Coasian theory of household formation
- As good as married? A model of premarital cohabitation and learning
- A model of partnership formation with friction and multiple criteria
- Over-the-counter trade and the value of assets as collateral
- DIVORCE AND THE OPTION VALUE OF MARITAL SEARCH
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs
- Frictional assignment. I: Efficiency
- Immigration, fertility, and growth
- Dynamically stable matching
- POSITIVE SKILL CLUSTERING IN ROLE‐ASSIGNMENT MATCHING MODELS
- Contracting and search with heterogeneous principals and agents
- Information avoidance in school choice
- Middlemen in search equilibrium with intensive and extensive margins
- Middlemen, inventories and economic dynamics
- Non-stationary search and assortative matching
- Existence of a non-stationary equilibrium in search-and-matching models: TU and NTU
- Same-sex marriage, the great equalizer
- Assessing racial and educational segmentation in large marriage markets
- Deadlines and matching
- Intermediation as rent extraction
- Pre-match investment with frictions
- Price discrimination and efficient matching
- A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
- Search for an object with two attributes
- Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity
This page was built for publication: Marriage and Class
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4351425)
