Pre-match investment with frictions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.06.004MaRDI QIDQ844905zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Chris Bidner

Publication date 5 February 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.06.004

zbMATH Keywords

frictionsmatchingpremarital investmentsignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Investment and Competitive Matching
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
• Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options
• Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.

Cites work

• Assortative Matching and Search
• Efficient non-contractible investments in large economies.
• Employer learning and statistical discrimination
• Learning and Wage Dynamics
• Marriage and Class
• Matching with noise and the acceptance curse
• The effect of better information on income inequality
• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals

Cited in

(3)

• Pre-matching gambles
• Investment and Competitive Matching
• Too much investment? A problem of endogenous outside options

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